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THE USE AND ABUSE OF REVOCABLE TRUSTS
By
Howard M. Zaritsky*
I. INTRODUCTION. Over the past 20 years the use of revocable
trusts in estate planning has grown to such an extent that,
while such trusts cannot be said to have replaced wills,
they do appear as the cornerstone of much of modern estate
planning. This increasing role played by revocable trusts
gives rise to two serious concerns.
First, there is a tendency to use revocable trusts as a
panacea, rather than as a specific device to cope with a
specific problem or set of problems.
Second, and of even greater concern, is the common
failure of many practitioners to comprehend the tax and
nontax ramifications of the use of revocable trusts,
particularly in the post mortem aspect.
This outline examines when a revocable trust should be
used in a modern estate plan, the problems that may arise in
drafting and administering a revocable trust, and the life-
time and post mortem tax consequences of the use of
revocable trusts.
II. THE REVOCABLE TRUST: A DEFINITION.
A. General. A revocable trust is an inter vivos trust over
which the grantor retains the power to revoke the trust
and reacquire its assets.
1. Express power. Generally, and in Virginia, a
power to revoke must be retained expressly. A
trust which is silent as to this power is deemed
irrevocable. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, Sec.
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330 (1959) ("RESTATEMENT"); 4 A. W. Scott, SCOTT
ON TRUSTS, Secs. 330, 330-1, 330.3, 332 (3d Ed.
1967 & Supp. 1987) ("SCOTT"). HQwever, some other
states follow the opposite policy and presume that
a trust is revocable unless it denies the power to
revoke. See Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 2280 (West.
1985); NY. Est., Powers & Trusts Law Sec. 7-1.9
(McKinney, 1967, Supp. 1987).
2. Narrowly construe1. A power to revoke a trust
will be r arrowly construed, so that a power to
revoke is not nornally deemed exercisable testa-
mentarily, unless the instrument says so. Cohn v.
Central National Bank, 191 Va. 12, 60 S.E. 2d 30
(1950); see also Euart v. Yoakley, 456 So. 2d 1327
(Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (power to revoke trust
upon notice to truste is not exercised by specific
devise of real estate owned by trust). Even if
revocation by will is expressly authorized in he
trust instrument, a mere residuary bequest should
not revoke the trust and bring its assets into the
probate estate, See Old Colony Trust Co. v.
Gardner, 264 Mass. 68, 161 N.E. 801 (1928); Re
Pozzuto's Estate, 188 A. 209 (1936).
3. Incapacitated grantor. If the grantor becomes
incapacitated, a committee or guardian may revoke
the trust only if So stated and authorized in the
trust instrument. See Chase National Bank of City
of New York v. Ginnel, 50 N.Y.S. 2d 345 (1944);
Friedrich v. Bancohio National Bank, 470 N.E. 2d
467 (Ohio App. 1984). If the grantor becomes
incapacitated and then tries to revoke the trust,
the trustee should resist the grantor's attempted
revocation. See Florida National Bank of Palm
Beach v. Genova, 460 So. 2d 895 (1984) (trustee
has a duty to inquire into the circumstances
surrounding a grantor's attempted revocation of a
trust, but the tristee should submit the matter to
judicial determination).
4. Attorney-in-fact's power. An attorney in fact
usually cannot revoke a revpcable trust unless the
power of attorney specifically grants the power.
See, however, Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 100 1/2, Sec.
la-23 (1985).
B. Joint Powers. The grantor's power to revoke the trust
may be exercisable alone or in conjunction with another
person. See Heintz v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 80,524
(1980). Someone who holds a joint power to revoke a
trust exercisable with the trust's grantor must not act
dishonestly or unreasonably withheld. Dewey v. State
Tax Comm'n, 346 Mass. 43, 190 N.E. 2d 203 (1963);
SCOTT, Sec. 330.10.
C. Funding. A revocable trust may be either unfunded
(awaiting a pourover from a will), fully funded (with
the grantor's entire estate), or partially funded (with
specific assets).
D. Inadvertently Irrevocable Trusts. An irrevocable trust
created under a mistake of fact or law can, in some
states, be reformed into a revocable trust. See SCOTT
Sec. 332; Ryan v. Brennan, 1 Mass. App. 469, 301 N.E.
2d 257 (1973) Hines v. Louisville Trust Co., 254 S.W.
2d 73 (Ky. 1952); Liberty Trust Co. v. Weber, 90 A. 2d
194, 200 Md. 491 (1952); and Colbo v. Bruyer, 235 Ind.
518, 134 N.E. 2d 45 (1956). Any gift taxes paid on the
creation of a mistakenly irrevocable trust should be
refundable. Dodge v. United States, 413 F.2d 1239 (5th
Cir. 1969) 1939), cert. denied 309 U.S. 680 (1940)
(mistake of fact); Touche v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 565 (1972)
(scrivner's error); and Berger v. United States, 487 F.
Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (mistake of fact).
III. THE REASONS FOR USING A REVOCABLE TRUST.
A. Management of the Grantor's Property.
1. Current management--the funded revocable trust. A
funded revocable trust may be useful for various
persons who need current management of their
wealth, or who merely wish to provide for such
management.
a. For persons incapable or not desirous of
managing wealth, including:
(1) Elderly or infirm persons.
(2) Inexperienced persons, including those
with recently inherited wealth.
(3) Persons who have recently attained the
age of majority and have received a
substantial distribution from a Uniform
Gift to Minors Act custodianship or an
Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") Sec.
2503(c) trust.
(4) Persons lacking time to manage their
wealth, such as entertainers, business
executives, busy entrepreneurs, and
successful professionals.
(5) Persons whose employment takes them
frequently away from the United States
for significant periods of time (1 year
or more), making asset management diffi-
cult, though such persons should also
consider less restrictive and often less
expensive management alternatives,
including agency relationships, invest-
ment advisory services, mutual funds,
common trust funds, or a power of
attorney.
b. For persons who manage their own assets, but
who need the trust for certain types of
wealth, including:
(1) Fractional interest in real estate or
oil and gas. When an interest is
bequeathed to a number of persons, a
revocable trust can be used to hold the
interests and permit convenient and
sensible management. On some of the tax
consequences of such a trust, see Ltr.
Rul. 8104202, discussed infra.
(2) Divided ownership of closely-held corpo-
rate stock. When family members own a
corporation's stock, a revocable trust
can be used to hold all of their inte-
rests, simplifying voting and business
management. However, beware tax compli-
cations under IRC Secs. 303, 6166A, and
subchapter S, discussed infra.
C. To manage individual assets which should be
segregated from the rest of the estate,
including:
(1) Contract rights. Certain types of con-
tract rights ought to be kept out of the
probate estate but should be made avail-
able to solve estate and beneficiary
liquidity problems. Such rights include
rights to royalties, deferred compensa-
tion payments, and unpaid installments
of a debt obligation (on installment
obligations, see also Rev. Rul. 73-584,
1973-2 C.B. 162, and Rev. Rul. 74-613,
1974-2 C.B. 153 [transfer of an install-
ment obligation to a revocable trust is
not a disposition under the pre-1980
rules] and Rev. Rul. 76-100, 1976-1 C.B.
123 [neither revocation of the trust and
return of the obligation to the grantor
nor the disposition of the obligation at
the grantor's death are dispositions
under the pre-1980 rules]). See infra.
(2) Community Property. Individuals who
move from a community property state to
a non-community property state may still
own community property and may desire to
maintain its special status. Similarly,
individuals who move into community
property states may wish to preserve the
status of separate property. Either
result can be achieved through a
revocable trust, drafted artfully with
several special provisions. On the
retention of the status of community
property brought into Virginia from a
community property state, see Common-
wealth v. Terjen, 197 Va. 596, 90 S.E.
2d 801 (1956); also see J. Rodney
Johnson, "Estate, Gift and Income Tax
Aspects of Virginia's Transplanted
Community Property--A Primer--," 29 VA.
BAR NEWS 24 (October 1980).
(a) A clear statement of the intent to
maintain the status of the trust
res as separate or community
property. See generally "The
Revocable Living Trust as an Estate
Planning Tool," (Report of the
Committee on Estate and Tax
Planning) 7 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR. J. 223, 229 (Summer 1972);
and "Estate Planning for the Migra-
tory Executive: A Panel," 5 REAL
PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 407
(Winter 1970).
(b) Avoid giving a spouse powers over
the corpus inconsistent with the
type of property the trust seeks to
maintain. If property is to be
separate, do not give each spouse
joint managerial authorities. See
generally Stanley M. Johanson,
"Revocable Trusts and Community
Property: The Substantive Prob-
lems," 47 TEX. L. REV. 537 (March
1969); and Stanley M. Johanson,
"Revocable Trusts, Widow's Election
Wills, and Community Property: The
Tax Problems," 47 TEX. L. REV. 1247
(Nov. 1969).
(c) Before deciding to retain separate
property status upon moving into a
community property state, consider
the basis adjustment to the entire
property, not merely the decedent's
one-half interest, allowed under
IRC Sec. 1014(b) (6); see also Rev.
Rul. 66-283, 1966-2 C.B. 297.
(d) This type of trust cannot be used
to defeat the rights of the survi-
ving spouse. See Land v. Marshall,
426 S.W. 2d 841 (Tex. 1968), in
which a husband sought to defeat
his wife's right in community pro-
perty by transferring it to a
revocable trust over which he main-
tained sole managerial control, but
the court held that the action was
in defraud of the wife and the
trust could be ignored.
d. To manage business interests during transi-
tional periods. A revocable business
interest transition trust may be used to
manage an interest in a closely-held business
for a limited, transitional period, such as
when an owner's health is impaired or when
the owner wishes to try out a youthful
successor, without permanently transferring
ownership.
(1) The revocable trust gives the youthful
successor, as trustee and, perhaps, a
beneficiary, a chance to manage the
business under the watchful eye of the
grantor, who can always revoke the trust
and reacquire the business interest if
desired.
(2) The successor's interest will perma-
nently vest upon the grantor's death.
(3) Beware tax problems under IRC Secs.
303, 6166A and subchapter S, discussed
infra.
e. To manage real estate. A revocable trust
offers a pass-through of deductions for inte-
rest and depreciation (though not affording a
pass through of deductions in excess of
income), making it initially appealing as a
management vehicle for real estate, though
difficult problems can arise with respect to
how title should be held.
(1) Title held by the trustees. In Vir-
ginia, title to real property can be
held directly by the trustees without
having to record the trust agreement.
Some title examiners will refuse to
approve title to property held in a
fiduciary capacity without seeing a copy
of the trust agreement.
(a) The examiner may have a legitimate
interest in seeing the trust agree-
ment to establish the trustee's
right to sell the property. See
Va. Code Sec. 55-61.1 (Repl. vol.
1986). See, however, Colo. Rev.
Stat. Sec. 38-30-108 (Rep. vol.
1982), expressly permitting the
passage of good title to property
held by a trust without examination
of the trust agreement.
(b) Unlike Virginia's rules, in some
states trusts are subject to the
same usury restrictions as indi-
viduals. In Virginia, real estate
investment trusts are not subject
to the usury rate limitations. Va.
Code Sec. 6.1-330.43 (Repl. vol.
1983).
(2) Nominee corporation. The trust could
establish a nominee corporation to hold
title to real estate on its behalf, thus
simplifying title recordation and
avoiding usury limitations in many
states. However, the IRS has repeatedly
contended that nominee corporations had
to be taxed like ordinary corporations,
eliminating the pass-through of real
estate expenses and deductions. They
have often won, too. See e.g., Ourisman
v- Comm'r, 760 F. 2d 541 (9th Cir.
1985), rev'g 82 T.C. 171 (1984); Raphan
v- U.S., 759 F. 2d 879 (Fed. Cir. 1986),
cert. denied 106 S. Ct. 129 (1985); but
also see Roccaforte v- Comm'r, 708 F. 2d
986 (5th Cir. 1983), rev'g 77 T.C. 263
(1981) (partnership treated as owner of
real property despite legal title in
nominee corporation). See also Stanley
D. Rosenbaum, "Unique Applications and
Pitfalls of Revocable Trusts," 29 U.S.C.
TAX INST. 503, 504-05 (1977); and Joel
E. Miller, "The Nominee Conundrum: The
Live Dummy is Dead, but the Dead Dummy
Should Live!" 34 TAX L. REV. 213 (1979).
(3) Nominee partnership. The best choice in
many states (including Virginia) is the
nominee partnership, composed of the
trustees and declaring the purpose of
the venture to be the holding and
management of real estate. The title
can be recorded in the name of the part-
nership merely by filing a trade name
affidavit, and most title examiners will
pass upon the title without requesting
to see the partnership agreement. Fur-
thermore, the usury limitations do not
apply to partnerships. Va. Code Sec.
6.1-330.43 (Repl. vol. 1983).
The trustees should be careful,
however, that special tax elections are
made at the partnership level, rather
than by the trustees as partners or
fiduciaries. See e.g., Rothenberg v.
Comm'r, 48 T.C. 369 (1967); and Rev.
Rul. 79-84, 1979-1 C.B. 223 (in which a
partnership election under IRC Sec. 754
had to be made by the partnership,
rather than by the trustees).
2. Future management. A funded or unfunded revocable
trust may be used also to provide for the future
management of the assets of an individual who is
presently capable of managing his or her own
wealth. The trust may provide for management upon
the disability of the individual during his or her
own lifetime, or for post mortem management of the
individual's assets for the benefit of the indi-
vidual's family.
a. Incompetency and the revocable stand-by
trust. The creation of a revocable trust for
future management of the grantor's estate in
anticipation of future incapacity, due to
senility, recurring disease, or serious dis-
ability, is an extremely useful device.
Generally, see Barbara K. Lundergan, "Sudden
Decline in Health of Client may Provide the
Impetus for Planning his Estate," 6 ESTATE
PLANNING 8 (1979); Edward 0. Osterberg, Jr.
"Current Trends and Techniques in the Use of
and Drafting of Revocable Trusts," 47 J.
TAX'N 332 (1977); and see also "The Revocable
Living Trust as an Estate Planning Tool,"
(Report of the Commitee on Estate and Tax
Planning) 7 REAL PROP-, PROB. & TR. J. 223,
224-25 (Summer 1972).
(1) Superiority over other devices. The
revocable stand-by trust is a generally
superior alternative to a durable power
of attorney or a committeeship.
(a) It can authorize far greater powers
for the trustee than can either a
durable power or a committeeship.
See Va. Code Sec. 8.01-67 et seq.
(Repl. vol. 1984).
(b) It is certainly less expensive to
establish and administer than a
committeeship, since it does not
require on-going supervision by the
courts.
(c) There also are questions regarding
the relationship between attor-
neys-in-fact and subsequently
appointed committees and guardians.
See, Va. Code Sec. 11-9.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1985), requiring the holder of
a durable power of attorney to
report to and be subject to the
control of a subsequently-appointed
committee or guardian. If the
power grants the attorney-in-fact
powers in excess of those of the
committee, it is not clear whether
the appointment of the committee
acts to limit the attorney-in-
fact's authority.
(d) The grantor can pick the trustee--
it is hard to pick one's committee.
(2) Funding. The revocable stand-by trust
may be presently funded with all or a
significant portion of the grantor's
assets, or it may be unfunded (or
nominally funded), but another person
may have a durable power of attorney to
fund the trust after the grantor's
incapacity.
(3) Beneficiaries. The grantor should
always be the main present beneficiary
of the stand-by trust, though it is
useful to allow the trustees to make
discretionary $10,000 corpus distribu-
tions to a broad class of other bene-
ficiaries, including most of the
grantor's family members, enabling the
trustee to reduce the size of an incom-
petent grantor's estate without
incurring a gift tax.
(a) These distributions may be condi-
tional upon the grantor being
disabled for an extended period of
time (two to five years seems
appropriate).
(b) If the grantor is married and his
or her spouse consents to gift-
splitting (IRC Sec. 2513), the
amount of the permissible distribu-
tions should be $20,000 per year
per donee.
(c) If the grantor has a very large
estate, consider designating a
charitable institution as the bene-
ficiary of a large discretionary
trust distribution if the grantor
remains incapacitated for an
extended period of time.
(d) The IRS has said in private rulings
that a gift made from a revocable
trust within three years of a
grantor's death is includible in
the grantor's gross estate. The
IRS noted that the trustee's
authorized gift constituted a
partial release of the grantor's
power to revoke the trust, and
since the release occurred within
three years of the grantor's death,
the property was brought back into
the estate. See Ltr. Rul. 8609005.
When a revocable trust did not
authorize such gifts expressly, the
same result was reached. Ltr. Rul.
8635007.
(4) Trustees. There should be either a co-
trustee with the grantor or a successor
trustee named. The co-trustee or
successor trustee should be the person
who will manage the grantor's estate in
case of incapacity.
(a) The grantor should have full man-
agerial authority during his or her
capacity.
(b) The other fiduciary should be
entirely relieved of all liability
for the grantor's actions during
the grantor's capacity. If the
other fiduciary is corporate, they
will normally require such
exculpation.
(5) Shift of control. When the grantor
becomes incapacitated, the control over
trust managerial decisions should shift
to the other trustee.
(a) Incapacity should be as determined
by a physical designated, either by
credentials or by name, in the
trust instrument. Cantwell, "Adju-
dication--Avoidance through Living
Trust," 1 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
J. 366 (Winter 1966).
(b) When there is particular reason to
believe that the grantor may be
ornery when incapacitated, use a
panel of physicians to provide
additional support in case of a
court contest.
(c) The shift should be a suspension of
the grantor's powers, not a termi-
nation, and the trust agreement
should clearly reflect this. A
permanent shift in control would
probably be a taxable gift to the
remainder beneficiaries (not quali-
fying for the annual exclusion).
See Treas. Regs. Secs. 25.2511-
2(b), (c) and 25.2511-3.
(6) Power to revoke. Only the grantor
should have the power to revoke the
instrument, since you do not want some-
one else revoking it after the grantor's
incapacity.
b. The revocable life insurance trust. Personal
life insurance trusts, the use of which has
grown in recent years, are sometimes vehicles
for estate tax savings but often also means
to assure competent management of the
insurance proceeds for the benefit of the
insured/grantor's family. When the insured
does not wish to surrender the present con-
trol over his or her policy, or does not wish
to incur a gift tax liability, a revocable
trust can still provide post mortem manage-
ment of the proceeds.
(1) Alternatives. The use of a revocable
life insurance trust is just one device
to manage life insurance proceeds. You
should always consider the others, as
well.
(a) Settlement options. Life insurance
companies will provide alternate
payment schedules which are self-
managing, including payment of the
proceeds in installments or as an
annuity. However, revocable life
insurance trusts commonly provide
greater flexibility in management
and investment, a significantly
higher investment return, and they
can be drafted to assure qualifica-
tion for the estate tax marital
deduction. See Rev. Rul. 64-310,
1964-2 C.B. 342; and Rev. Rul. 55-
733, 1955-2 C.B. 388; but also see
Rev. Rul. 77-130, 1977-1 C.B. 289;
and Rev. Rul. 57-423, 1957-2 C.B.
623.
(b) Testamentary insurance trust.
Proceeds of a life insurance policy
may be made payable to a testamen-
tary trust. Va. Code Sections
38.1-408.1 and 38.1-442.1 (Repl.
vol. 1986).. See also Md. Estate
and Trust Code Sec. 11-105(c)
(1974). The proceeds may be paid
to a testamentary life insurance
trust either through the estate or
directly. If the proceeds are
payable to the insured's estate and
the estate is required to pay them
to the trust, they are subject to
the claims of the grantor's credi-
tors, possibly depleting an
important source of liquidity. In
many states having inheritance
taxes, furthermore, both direct
payment to the trust and payment
through the estate often results in
a loss of the exemption for life
insurance proceeds, since neither
the estate nor the testamentary
trust is a "named beneficiary."
(2) Designation of trust as beneficiary.
The grantor need not give the policy to
the revocable trust, but merely desig-
nate it as the policy beneficiary.
(3) Funding. The policy designation itself
appears to be an adequate corpus to
create the trust. Va. Code Sec. 64.1-
73(b) (Repl. vol. 1987). Nominal
funding, however, is always a good idea.
See also N.Y. Estates, Powers & Trusts
Law Sec. 13-3.3 (1967).
(4) Estate tax savings. While the proceeds
are includible in the insured/grantor's
gross estate under IRC Sec. 2042, a
well drafted trust can prevent their
subsequent inclusion in the estate of
the surviving spouse, to the extent that
the proceeds are otherwise sheltered
from tax by the insured's unified
credit.
(a) Beneficiary's powers. The revoc-
able insurance trust should give
the surviving spouse no powers
rising to the status of a general
power of appointment under IRC Sec.
2041. Therefore, the surviving
spouse (as beneficiary and as
trustee), may have the right to all
of the trust's income, the right to
distributions of corpus as required
for the spouse's "health, educa-
tion, support and maintenance," and
the noncumulative right to a corpus
distribution equal to the greater
of five percent of corpus or
$5,000.
(b) A/B Insurance Trust. If the estate
is planned to achieve an optimum
estate tax marital deduction, the
insurance can be used to fund the
by-pass or B trust, as noted above,
or it can be used to fund the
marital or A share of the estate.
As is noted above, the revocable
trust is one way to assure that the
form of the insurance benefit qual-
ifies for the estate tax marital
deduction. See supra.
(c) Liquidity. The liquidity of the
surviving spouse's estate can be
assured by directing the trust to
lend money to the spouse's estate,
secured by estate assets, and to
purchase estate assets (at no gain
to the estate, which has received a
step-up [or down] in basis under
IRC Sec. 1014). This same direc-
tion can be given with respect to
the estate of the insured, to pro-
vide liquidity to pay estate taxes.
This method of providing liquidity
is also superior to merely desig-
nating the spouse or children as
the policy beneficiaries, since
beneficiaries sometimes cease their
willingness to provide funds to the
estate, while the trustee can be
directed to make such provision.
(5) Trustee selection. The insured or the
insured's spouse may certainly be the
trustee of a revocable trust during the
insured's lifetime. The selection of
the trustee for post mortem management
depends on the usual criteria of trustee
selection, including financial acumen,
reliability, and solvency.
(6) Trustee's fees. Trustees rarely charge
any significant fee for managing a
revocable trust funded only with a
policy beneficiary designation, until
after the grantor dies, when the
standard fee schedules used by corporate
fiduciaries come into play.
(7) Policy owner. Either the insured should
maintain ownership of the policy on his
or her own life (and merely designate
the trust as the beneficiary), or the
policy can be assigned to the trust.
(a) The insured's spouse should not be
given the policy. An assignment of
the policy to the insured's spouse
is a taxable gift (though eligible
for the annual exclusion and
marital deduction).
(b) A gift of the policy to the
insured's spouse can, in case of
the spouse's premature death,
return the policy to the insured's
gross estate through direct
bequest to the insured or through
bequest to a testamentary trust of
which the insured is the trustee
and a beneficiary. See Rev. Rul.
84-179, 1984-2 C.B. 195.
(8) Spouse ownership and the revocable
trust. In Estate of Margrave v. Comm'r,
71 T.C. 13 (1978), acq. 1981-1 C.B. 1,
aff'd 618 F. 2d 34 (8th Cir. 1980), the
courts held that the insured husband had
no incidents of ownership over a life
insurance policy owned by his wife when
the beneficiary was the husband's
revocable life insurance trust. The
courts held that the husband had a mere
"power over an expectancy subject to the
absolute whim of the policy owner." See
generally also Eliasberg, "Estate of
Robert B. Margrave and the Estate Taxa-
tion of Life Insurance--Incidents of
Ownership Revisited," 57 TAXES 615
(1979); Katzenstein, "Use of Insured's
Trust as Beneficiary Inadvisable Despite
Recent Decision," 6 ESTATE PLANNING 20
(1979); and Pearle, "Spouse-owned Policy
Payable to Decedent's Revocable Trust,"
TAX MGMT MEMO. No. 78-26, p. 3 (1978).
(a) However, in Rev. Rul. 81-166, 1981-
2 C.B. 477, the IRS agreed with
Margrave but, on identical facts,
said that the spouse's designation
of the revocable trust as the bene-
ficiary was an incomplete gift to
the trust's other beneficiaries,
and that the gift was completed
when the insured died and the pro-
ceeds were paid to that trust.
Thus, when the insured died, the
spouse-owner was deemed to have
made a completed gift to the other
trust beneficiaries of a share of
the proceeds.
(b) Also, in Rev. Rul. 81-166, the IRS
said that when the beneficiary was
a nonmarital trust in which the
surviving spouse had an income
interest, the surviving spouse's
deemed gift to the trust was tied
to a retained income interest,
bringing the trust fund into the
surviving spouse's own gross estate
under IRC Secs. 2036 and 2038.
c. The revocable retirement plan death benefit
trust. It is common for individuals to seek
assurance of competent future management for
their retirement plan death benefits under a
corporate or other retirement benefits
through either annuity distributions or the
use of a trust. A revocable retirement plan
death benefit trust is one good method for
accomplishing this result.
(1) Estate taxation. Qualified plan death
benefits are fully includible in the
deceased participant's gross estate,
regardless of to whom they are paid.
Thus, payment to a revocable trust
can neither present nor solve any estate
tax problems.
(2) Document efficiency. The same revocable
trust can serve as a revocable life
insurance trust, a revocable retirement
plan death benefit trust, and the by-
pass (non-marital) trust in a marital
deduction estate plan.
(3) Testamentary trusts. It is unclear
whether Virginia statutorily authorizes
payment of retirement plan death bene-
fits to a testamentary trust. Va. Code
Sections 38.1-408.1 and 38.1-442.1
(Repl. vol. 1986) authorize designation
of a testamentary trustee as the benefi-
ciary of life insurance proceeds, and
Va. Code Sec. 38.1-408.1 (Repl. vol.
1986) says that the term "policy of life
insurance" is to be construed to include
other types of contracts under which
proceeds become payable on the
testator's death. Does this include
retirement plan death benefits? If
retirement benefits are payable to a
testamentary trust under an ineffective
designation, the benefits will be deemed
payable to the participant's estate and
will become taxable, regardless of their
form. In the absence of clear state law
validating the use of testamentary
trusts, estate taxes can still be
avoided by paying the benefits to an
executor who is required (under the
will) immediately to pay the proceeds
into the trust and not to make them
available for the satisfaction of the
estate's other obligation. See Rev.
Rul. 73-404, 1973-2 C.B. 319; and
"Estate of Perlick v. United States, 31
AFTR 2d 73-1437 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
(4) Income in respect of a decedent. Lump
sum and other retirement plan death
benefits that are includible in the
participant's gross estate are income in
respect of a decedent (I.R.D.) subject
to full estate and income taxation.
IRC Sec. 691.
(a) I.R.D. deduction. The estate or
recipient beneficiary gets an
income tax deduction for the estate
taxes paid on the I.R.D. IRC Sec.
691(c).
(b) Interaction with the marital deduc-
tion. The I.R.D. deduction is
computed on the basis of the addi-
tional amount of estate taxes due
because of the inclusion of the
I.R.D. in the gross estate, so the
deduction may be reduced if the
retirement benefits are paid to the
surviving spouse in a form qual-
ifying for the marital deduction,
and if more than half of the I.R.D.
is included in the marital deduc-
tion share of the estate (or the
I.R.D. is included in an under-
funded marital deduction share).
Payment to a revocable trust with
by-pass powers does not qualify for
the marital deduction and maximizes
the I.R.D. deduction. See
Hastings, "Income in Respect of a
Decedent: A New Look Under the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 and the Revenue
Act of 1978," 37th N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED TAX. Sec. 43.03 (1979).
(5) Retirement Equity Act. The Retirement
Equity Act of 1984 prevents designating
anyone other than a surviving spouse as
the beneficiary of a qualified plan
death benefit, without the spouse's
express written consent. The waiver
must either be notarized or witnessed.
(6) 5-Year Payout. IRC Sec. 401(a) (9)
requires that the plan provide for a
full payout within five years after a
participant's death, or if payable to a
"designated beneficiary," a payout over
the beneficiary's life expectancy. It
is unclear whether a revocable trust may
be a designated beneficiary exempt from
the 5-year mandatory payout requirement.
(6) State law questions. It is not clear,
absent a governing statute, whether a
revocable trust may be designated as the
beneficiary of a retirement plan death
benefit. See Calif. Prob. Code Sec.
6321 (Supp. 1987) and Md. Estates and Trust
Code Sec. 11-105(b) (1974). However, the
same argument made with respect to a
testamentary trust can be applied to
contend that Virginia law (Va. Code Sec.
38.1-408.1 (Repl. vol. 1986)) authorizes
payment of a retirement plan death
benefit to a revocable trust,
particularly in light of the separate
provision of Va. Code Sec. 64.1-73
(Repl. vol. 1987). It is unlikely that
a mere retirement plan beneficial
designation is sufficient corpus with
which to fund a revocable trust, and
additional corpus should be used. See,
however, Md. Estates and Trusts Code
Sec. 11-105 (1974).
(7) Authorizing documents. The retirement
plan instrument should specifically
authorize the designation of a trust as
the beneficiary of a participant's death
benefits.
B. Protecting the Settlor's Assets.
1. General. A revocable trust can be used to protect
the grantor's assets from the importunities of
others. Thus, a revocable trust may be able to
insulate the grantor's assets (or specific assets)
from the claims of the grantor's spouse, creditors
and sometimes children.
2. Claims of Creditors. The claims of the grantor's
creditors cannot be defeated by placing the
grantor's assets in a revocable trust. The
details of the creditors' rights are dictated by
state law.
a. Virginia. Va. Code Sec. 55-19 (Repl. vol.
1986) authorizes spendthrift trusts of up to
$500,000, and it does not specifically rule
out the grantor being the beneficiary, except
to the extent that such a trust cannot
operate to prejudice any existing creditors
of the grantor. See Alderman v. Virginia
Trust Co., 181 Va. 497, 25 S.E. 2d 333
(1943); Hutchinson v. Maxwell, 100 Va. 169,
40 S.E. 655 (1902); Sheridan v. Krause, 161
Va. 873, 172 S.E. 508 (1934); and Rountree v.
Lane, 155 F. 2d 471 (4th Cir. 1946).
b. Other states--generally. In some other
states, both present and future creditors can
attach the assets of such a trust. See N.Y.
Estates, Powers & Trusts Law Sec. 7-3.1
(1967). In some, the power to revoke is
equated with the ownership of the trust
corpus, for this purpose. See Kan. Stat.
Sec. 58-2414 (1976); and Ohio Rev. Code Sec.
1335.01 (1979). This is particularly impor-
tant if the grantor is not a beneficiary of
the trust. See RESTATEMENT Sec. 330; also
see Matter of Granwell, 20 N.Y. 2d 91, 228
N.E. 2d 779 (1967).
c. Transfers in defraud of creditors.
Typically, the trust will be ignored if the
transfer to the trust was in defraud of the
grantor's creditors. See Va. Code Sec. 55-80
et seq. (Repl. vol. 1986); and the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyances Act, adopted in 25
states.
d. Trustee in bankruptcy. A trustee in
bankruptcy can always reach the assets of a
revocable trust to pay the claims of the
bankrupt's creditors. 11 U.S.C. Sec. ll0a
(1976).
3. Defeating the elective rights of a surviving
spouse. A widow has a right in all states (except
some community property states) to renounce the
decedent's will and take a statutory share or
common law dower. In some states, a surviving
husband has similar rights. In Virginia, both
have the right to a statutory share. Normally,
however, these rights extend to the decedent's
probate assets only and, since the assets held in
a revocable trust are not probate assets, the
question is raised whether they may be reached by
the surviving spouse. Generally see "The
Revocable Living Trust as an Estate Planning"
(Report of the Committee on Estate and Tax Plan-
ning), 7 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 223, 237
(Summer 1972); Russo & Kirkwood, "The Use of a
Revocable Trust to Defeat the Elective Share," 57
FLA. BAR J. 110 (1983); and Daniel M. Schuyler,
"Revocable Trusts--Spouses, Creditors and Other
Predators," 8th MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 74-
13 (1974).
a. Old Massachusetts rule. In Kerwin v.
Donaghy, 317 Mass. 559, 59 N.E. 2d 229
(1945), the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts held that a grantor could
defeat his wife's elective rights by placing
all of his assets in a revocable trust,
though the court acknowledged that the
revocable trust had been established to
defeat the wife's rights.
(1) Virginia. There appears to be no
definitive Virginia law on this point,
but see Hall v. Hall, 109 Va. 117, 63
S.E. 420 (1909) (deceased put assets in
trust with retained life estate and
court held that he could defeat his
wife's dower right by irrevocably trans-
ferring the property, even if he
retained a life estate.)
(2) States following Massachusetts. A
number of states have followed the
Massachusetts rule-
(a) Arkansas. Richards v. Worthen Bank
& Trust Co., 261 Ark. 890, 552 S.W.
2d 228 (1977).
(b) Connecticut. Cherniack v. Home
National Bank & Trust Co. of
Meridian, 151 Conn. 367, 198 A. 2d
58 (1964);
(c) District of Columbia. Windsor v.
Leonard, 475 F. 2d 932 (1973).
(d) Illinois. Toman v. Svoboda, 349
N.E. 2d 668 (Ill. Ct. App. 1976);
Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322
Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75
(1944); Johnson v. LaGrange Bank,
365 N.E. 2d 1056 (Ill. 1977).
(e) Indiana. Leazenby v- Clinton County
Bank & Trust Co., 355 N.E. 2d 861
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
(f) Kentucky. DeLeuil's Executors v.
DeLeuil, 255 Ky. 406, 74 S.W. 2d
474 (1934).
(g) Maryland. Windsor v- Leonard, 475
F. 2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(applying Maryland law);
Whittington v- Whittington, 205 Md.
1, 106 A. 2d 72 (1954); Brown v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94
A. 523 (1915).
(h) Michigan. Rose v. Union Guardian
Trust Co., 300 Mich. 73, 1 N.W. 2d
458 (1942).
(i) Utah. Horn v. First Security Bank,
548 P. 2d 1265 (Utah. 1976).
(j) Vermont. Dunnett v. Shields, 97 Vt.
419, 123 A. 626 (1926).
(k) West Virginia. Davis v. KB&T Co.,
309 S.E. 2d 45 (W. Va. 1983).
(3) States Rejecting the Old Massachusetts
rule. Other states, including Massa-
chusetts itself, have specifically
refused to follow the Old Massachusetts
rule.
(a) Kansas. Ackers v. First National
Bank of Topeka, 192 Kan. 319, 387
P. 2d 840 (1964), reh. denied 389
P. 2d 1 (1964).
(b) Massachusetts. Sullivan v. Burkin,
460 N.E. 2d 572 (Mass. 1984).
(c) Missouri. Wanstrath v. Kappel, 356
Mo. 210, 201 S.W. 2d 327 (1947).
(d) North Carolina. Moore v.
Jones, 261 S.E. 2d 289 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1980).
(e) New York. MacGregor v. Fox, 280
App. Div. 435, 114 N.Y. 2d 286
(1952), aff'd 305 N.Y. 576, Il1
N.E. 2d 445 (1953); Newman v. Dore,
275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937).
(f) Ohio. Purcel v. Cleveland Trust Co.,
Ohio App. 2d 235, 217 N.E. 2d 876
(1965); Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio
St. 437, 72 N.E. 2d 378 (1947);
Bolles V. Toledo Trust, 144 Ohio
St. 195, 58 N.E. 2d 381 (1944).
(g) Pennsylvania. Estate of Pengelly,
374 Pa. 358, 97 A. 2d 844 (1953).
(h) Tennessee. Sherrill v- Mallicote,
57 Tenn. App. 241, 417 S.W. 2d 798
(1967).
(4) Uniform Probate Code. Section 2-202 of
the U.P.C. extends the elective rights
of a surviving spouse to the "augmented
estate," which includes the value of any
property transferred by the decedent
during his or her lifetime for less than
adequate consideration in money or
money's worth, over which the deceased
retained a power to revoke or an income
interest. See similar statutory
provisions in N.Y. Estates, Powers &
Trusts Law Sec. 5-1.5 (1967). Also see
Kurtz, "The Augmented Estate Concept
Under the Uniform Probate Code: In
Search of an Equitable Elective Share,"
62 IOWA L. R. 981 (1977); Note, "Widow's
Election Under the Augmented Estate," 57
NEB. L. R. 146 (1978).
(5) Adopting another state's rule. In
states like Virginia, which have no
rule, or states which have a rule
favorable to the elective rights of the
surviving spouse, it may be possible to
defeat the spouse's rights through a
revocable trust established in
Massachusetts (or another state
following the Massachusetts rule).
Obviously, the rules governing conflicts
of laws of various states would be rele-
vant in determining the law governing
construction of the trust, but there is
case law in some states authorizing such
forum shopping. See Matter of Clark, 21
N.Y. 2d 478, 236 N.E. 2d 152 (1963); and
compare with National Shawmut Bank v.
Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E. 337
(1950). No clear authority exists,
however, regarding the establishment by
a grantor residing in state B (rejecting
the Massachusetts rule) of a trust in
state A (following the Massachusetts
rule), funded with real property located
in state C (rejecting the Massachusetts
rule).
4. Defeating the elective rights of a child. In
Louisiana and some foreign countries, children
have a right to a statutory share of the estate of
a deceased parent. This is known as a "forced
heirship." See La. Civ- Code Sections 1493-5,
1502 (1952, Supp. 1987). A revocable trust might
also be used to defeat a forced heirship, though
there is no case law on this point and one would
probably have to analogize to the cases on
defeating the rights of a surviving spouse. See
Watts v. Swiss Bank Corporation, 27 N.Y. 2d 270
(1979), in which the elective forced heirship
under foreign law was not cut off by a revocable
trust because of applicable conflicts of laws
principles. See also Estate of Renard, 56 N.Y. 2d
973 (1982), in which a New York court refused to
decline jurisdiction and stated that a New York
court could refuse to enforce the rights of forced
heirship created under French law, when a testator
with substantial New York connection wrote a pair
of situs wills, leaving little to her children.
C. The Funded Revocable Trust as a Will Substitute.
1. General. Restraint should always be exercised in
discussing the use of a funded revocable trust as
a will substitute since it is a popular misconcep-
tion that a revocable trust makes a fine complete
will substitute. In reality, a revocable trust is
rarely a complete will substitute since it is only
in a very unusual circumstance that the grantor's
entire assets are placed in the trust, if for no
other reason than the fact that assets are
constantly being acquired and disposed of.
2. The necrophobic client. A funded revocable trust
may be a good will replacement when a client is
unwilling to execute a property will from the
apparently common belief that contemplation of
one's own mortality hastens in some way the date
at which such documents cease to be ambulatory.
Suggest, instead, a "living trust", and some of
these clients will consent to executing the docu-
ments. See Edward Schlesinger, "Seven Case
Histories of the Revocable Trust," 5TH MIAMI INST.
ON EST. PLAN. ch. 71 (1971).
3. Avoiding probate. One of the major reasons a
funded revocable trust is often suggested is the
avoidance of probate. Generally, this is not a
sufficient reason since most probates are quick,
relatively inexpensive, and serve the useful pur-
pose of clearing title to all estate assets. See
e.g., Malcolm A. Moore, "The Advantages of Pro-
bate," 10TH MIAMI INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch.76
(1976). However, sometimes avoiding probate (in
whole or for certain assets) is still advisable.
a. Avoiding post probate court supervision. The
best reason for using a funded (or unfunded)
revocable trust is the avoidance of on-going
court supervision, which may be expensive and
time-consuming. Va. Code Sec. 26-17 (Repl.
vol. 1985). However, see Will of Reed, 91
Misc. 2d 997, 399 N.Y.S. 2d 101 (Surr. Ct.
1977); Matter of Fornason, 88 Misc. 2d 736,
389 N.Y.S. 2d 1003 (Surr. Ct. 1976); and
Matter of Frohlich, 87 Misc. 2d 518, 385
N.Y.S. 2d 922 (Surr. Ct. 1976), holding that
a New York Surrogates court had jurisdiction
over funded revocable trusts when the terms
of the trusts intimately concern the "affairs
of decedents." See also Renee R. Roth, "New
Legislation Affecting Estates, Trusts," 184
N.Y.L.J. 1 (November 24, 1980).
b. Accountings. Va. Code Sec. 26-17 (Repl. vol.
1985) requires accountings for a "personal
representative, guardian, curator, committee,
testamentary trustee, trustee under Sec.
37.1-134, and receiver under Sec. 55-44."
This is deemed to exempt trustees of inter
vivos trusts unless the trustee is required
to qualify (e.g., a trustee for a mentally
ill person, under Va. Code Sec. 37.1-134
(Repl. vol. 1985). The revocable trust can
avoid the problems raised by judicial
accountings for minor beneficiaries by
requiring the trustee to account only at
specific times and for the adult
beneficiaries and the guardians of the minor
beneficiaries. While Virginia law is silent
on this point, the laws of some states permit
informal accounts. See, e.g., N.Y.S.C.P.A.
Sec. 2202 (1967); or see Tex. Prob. Code Sec.
145 (1980), greatly simplifying the
accounting when an "independent trust
administration" is authorized.
c. Small businesses. If the decedent owns a
proprietorship which cannot be continued by
the family, it may be necessary to arrange a
prompt sale after the date of death to avoid
a substantial diminution in value. In such
cases, even the relatively minor delays of
probate should be avoided, and the business
may be held in a revocable trust.
d. Ancillary administration. If the decedent
owns property in another state, an ancillary
administration may be avoided by putting the
property in a revocable trust the situs of
which is the state of the decedent's
domicile.
(1) Alternative. Obviously, this is not the
only way to achieve this result, and
incorporation or a family partnership
should also be considered.
(2) Double domicile problems. This use of a
revocable trust also may avoid the prob-
lem of establishing a dual domicile,
which can result in double or other
multiples of inheritance taxes. See
Estate of Dorrance, 333 Pa. 162, 3 A. 2d
682 (1931), cert. denied 287 U.S. 660
(1932); In re Dorrance, 115 N.J. Eq.
268, 170 A. 743 (1934); Dorrance v.
Martin, 116 N.J. Eq. 362, 184 A. 601
(1935), cert. denied 298 U.S. 678
(1936). See also Texas v. Florida, 306
U.S. 398 (1938).
e. Passive assets. Certain estate assets do not
require probate administration because of
their highly passive character. If the
grantor owns contract rights, such as death
benefits, royalty rights, and unpaid install-
ment obligations, these may be kept out of
probate through a revocable trust.
f. Will contests. A revocable trust may be
useful to avoid a will contest based on undue
influence or incompetency.
(1) Continuing management. The ongoing
management of the trust tends to dispute
any claim of incompetency (or, one
supposes, to support it if the manage-
ment is done in a totally incompetent
manner).
(2) Practical difficulty of such challenges.
While the trust is not legally any less
succeptible to challenge, as a practical
matter challenge is more difficult. To
challenge the provisions of a revocable
trust, the heir must find out the con-
tents of the trust and institute a
separate legal action (rather than
merely intervening in the probate).
This is even more complicated for the
contestant if the trust is located in
another state. To contest a will the
individual merely brings a bill to
impeach. Va. Code Sec. 64.1-88 (Repl.
vol. 1987).
(3) Alternative. Consider also the execu-
tion of sequential, annual wills, all
containing the same provision, to show
that the dispositive provisions actually
represented the testator's desires.
Jeffrey L. Crown, "Thwarting the Will
Contest--Some Psychological Aspects of
Will Drafting and Execution," 1980-1 TAX
MGMT. EST., GIFTS & TR. J. 25 (January-
February 1980).
g. Publicity. Wills are recorded in Virginia
and, therefore, become public knowledge. Va.
Code Sec. 64.-94 (Repl. vol. 1987). A funded
revocable trust also avoids the publicity of
probate, which may be important if the
deceased is a celebrity or if the terms of
the will are embarrassing to some members of
the family. Avoiding publicity may also be
important in staving off "gold-digging"
suitors for the surviving spouse and
children, and in providing for illegitimate
children or paramours.
(1) Inheritance tax publicity. In some
states, the revocable trust does not
entirely assure the desired privacy
because, not only must the decedent's
federal estate tax return be included
with the state inheritance tax return,
but the state return is made public.
See e.g., Rev. Rul. 70-454, 1970-2 C.B.
296, superseding Rev. Rul. 55-238, 1955-
1 C.B. 335. In Virginia, while there is
no inheritance tax, the former
inheritance tax laws assure privacy of
tax returns. Va. Code Sections 58-46
and 58-46.1 (Repl. vol. 1986). It is
not clear whether these apply to the
present Virginia estate tax return.
(2) Be careful about making a spouse the
personal representative if he or she is
not to know the terms of the revocable
trust, since a copy will be required
with the federal estate tax return.
h. Unclear probate laws. A funded revocable
trust is a fine method by which to avoid
being a test case of a new state probate
code.
i. Mortmain statutes. Many states (though not
Virginia, see Va. Code Sections 55-26 et.
seq. and 57-7 (Repl. vol. 1986)) have mort-
main statutes precluding charitable bequests
in wills which are executed within a
specified time of the date of death. These
statutes do not normally apply to transfers
by a revocable trust, enabling one to defeat
their application.
(1) Validity. There are serious questions
about the continued validity of such
statutes. See Estate of French v.
Doyle, 365 A. 2d 621 (D.C.Ct. App. 1976)
(holding the D.C. statute unconstitu-
tional); and Note: "Mortmain Statutes:
Questions on Constitutionality," 52
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 638 (1977).
(2) Alternatives. Some states, such as New
York have mortmain statutes which merely
provide that other beneficiaries can
challenge a charitable bequest if they
receive less because of the bequest. In
such states, the practice is, rather
than establishing a revocable trust, to
provide that if the bequest is voided,
the gift passes to an individual not
otherwise a beneficiary. This
eliminates all possible challenges.
D. Choice of a Situs.
1. General. A revocable trust can also be used to
allow the grantor to select the situs of adminis-
tration and disposition of certain assets, a bene-
fit not otherwise enjoyed with property is
disposed of testamentarily. See generally
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF LAW, Secs. 241, 294(1).
2. Establishing trust situs. The situs of a trust
and the law governing its application may be
determined by the location of the trust corpus,
the residence of the trustee, and statements con-
tained in the trust instrument. Consequently, it
is normally possible to "adopt" another state's
law with respect to realty located in that state
and with respect to personalty held in a trust in
that state, by having a local fiduciary and by
stating in the trust agreement that the trust law
of the desired state is to govern.
3. Objectives. There are many benefits derived from
placing the situs of the trust in another state:
a. Selection of fiduciary. If an out-of-state
corporate fiduciary is desired, it should be
possible to avoid provisions like Va. Code
Sec. 26-59 (Repl. vol. 1985) by the use of a
funded revocable trust established in another
state.
(1) Validity. See Fain v. Hall, 463 F.
Supp. 661 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (holding
unconstitutional a Florida statutory
prohibition against nonresident non-
family members serving as executor); and
BT Investment Managers, Inc. v. Lewis,
461 F. Supp. 1187 (N.D.Fla. 1978)
(holding unconstitutional a Florida
statutory prohibition against nonresi-
dent corporate fiduciaries); but also
see In re Emery, 59 Ohio App. 2d 7, 391
N.E. 2d 746 (1978) (holding constitu-
tional Ohio's statutory requirement that
executors and aministrators be domiciled
in the state).
(2) Pour-overs. If the will pours over into
the revocable trust, Virginia law
requires a resident fiduciary. Va. Code
Sec. 64.1-73(a) (3) (Repl. vol. 1987).
b. Defeat of spouse's rights. As has been
noted, this may permit the defeat of the
elective rights of a surviving spouse.
4. Tax problems. Be careful in selecting the situs
of a revocable trust since not all states adopt
the Federal (and Virginia) concept of a grantor
trust for income tax purposes. If the grantor
resided in Virginia, a state that uses the grantor
trust concept, but the trust is situated in a
state that does not recognize this concept, the
result is double income taxation of the trust
income. Generally, see Brian M. Freeman, "State
Power to Tax Trust Income on Basis of Settlor's or
Grantor's Residence or Domicile," 53 TAXES 237
(April 1975); and on the constitutionality of
double state individual income taxation, see Curry
v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
5. Foreign trusts. A revocable foreign trust may
offer the ability to invest in certain securitites
not otherwise available in the United States, and
to use certain foreign fiduciaries not licensed in
the United States. Transfers of appreciated
property to such trusts are not initially subject
to the 35 percent excise tax on appreciation under
Rev- IRC Sec. 1491, but they might be subject when
the grantor dies. See Rev. Rul. 87-61, IRB 1987-
28, p. 11 (1987). See generally Zaritsky, Tax
Management No. 416 FOREIGN TRUSTS (1980).
E. Improving Estate Liquidity.
1. Family Liquidity. A revocable trust better
provides for post mortem family liquidity than
mere ownership of liquid assets, because its
assets are not tied up in probate and may be used
immediately to provide needed funds.
2. Pour-Back Trusts. A revocable trust may also be
required to pour assets back to the estate,
providing estate liquidity. See also Raymond L.
Sutton, Jr., "The Use of Pour-Back Provisions in a
Revocable Trust," 1980-3 TAX MGMT ESTATES, GIFTS &
TR. J. 4 (1980).
3. Flower bonds. To maximize the benefits of buying
and holding flower bonds, they should be purchased
close to the date of death. This can be
accomplished well either through a durable power
of attorney or the use of a revocable trust.
a. Durable power of attorney. Durable powers of
attorney may be exercised by the attorney-in-
fact even after the incompetency of the
grantor. Flower bonds purchased under such a
power are still viewed as owned by the
deceased and still are redeemable in payment
of estate taxes.
(1) Virginia recognizes durable powers of
attorney. Va. Code Sec. 11-9.1 (Repl.
vol. 1985).
(2) There is substantial case law to the
effect that flower bonds purchased under
a nondurable power of attorney are still
redeemable in payment of estate taxes.
See e.g., Estate of Pfohl v. Commr, 70
T.C. 630 (1978); and see Estate of
Watson v. United States, 442 F. Supp.
1000 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd for lack of
subject matter jur. 586 F. 2d 925 (2d
Cir. 1978).
b. Revocable trust. Treasury regulations permit
redemption of flower bonds purchased by a
revocable trust even if the grantor was
incapacitated at the time of the purchase, as
long as the trustee is expressly and uncon-
ditionally required to use the funds to pay
the grantor's estate taxes, the trust
terminates in favor of the estate (a pour-
back), or state law apportions a share of the
taxes to the trust. 31 C.F.R. Sec.
306.28(a), (b), (c); Form PD 1782, Schedule
T. Virginia law apportions taxes to a
revocable trust's assets. Va. Code Sections
64.1-161, 64.1-162 (Repl. vol. 1987).
(1) Trust clauses: When a revocable trust
is used to purchase flower bonds,
either:
(a) The will should direct the executor
to certify to the trustee the
amount of estate tax liability, and
exculpate the trustee when he or
she relies on this certification;
or
(b) Alternatively, the trust documents
can direct the trustee to turn over
all bonds to the executor, subject
to margin loans, for payment of the
estate taxes.
(2) Valuation. Flower bonds held by a
revocable trust are valued, for estate
tax and basis purposes, at their fair
markaet value on the date of death. If
the bonds are available for payment of
estate taxes, their fair market value is
their face amount. If they are not
usable for payment of estate taxes,
their fair market value is the
discounted market price. In Private
Letter Ruling 7934060, flower bonds were
held in a typical combination revocable
marital and non-marital trust and the
trustee had the power to fund the
different sub-trusts with whichever
assets he chose. The taxes were only
paid from the non-marital share and not
from the marital share. The I.R.S.
ruled privately that all of the bonds
were valued at their face amount, no
matter to which share they were
allocated, since all could have been
used to pay estate taxes.
III. DRAFTING, EXECUTING AND FUNDING THE REVOCABLE TRUST.
A. Drafting the Revocable Trust. Revocable trusts require
surprisingly careful drafting, though it is certainly
easy to correct errors, if caught prior to the
grantor's demise-
1. Application of income. Payment or application of
income to the grantor should be directed
expressly, though a discretionary accumulation
power may be granted in the event of the grantor's
disability.
2. Distributions of principal. Discretion should be
granted to use principal for the grantor's bene-
fit. A power may also be given the trustee to
sprinkle principal among other beneficiaries in
the event of the grantor's disability, to permit
continued estate reduction. The trustee may even
be directed to maintain a charitable gift program
in case of the grantor's extended disability.
3. Insurance powers. The grantor should generally
reserve all rights over the insurance policies,
though the trustee may be granted limited powers
with respect to those policies payable to the
trust.
4. Tax clauses.
a. Flower bonds. If the trust will hold flower
bonds, the trustee should be empowered to use
the bonds to pay estate taxes, to assure
their redeemability.
b. Secondary pour-back. The trustee may be
directed to deliver all assets, other than
death benefits, to the executor, to the
extent that the residuary estate is insuffi-
cient to pay death taxes, funeral and
administration expenses, and other estate
obligations.
(1) There should be a correlative provision
in the will requiring the executor to
certify the amount of the insufficiency
to the trustee.
(2) The trust should absolve the trustee
from any liability if the trustee relies
on the executor's certification and
should relieve the trustee of any duty
to assure that the executor uses the
funds for payment of the certified
expenses. The trustee is absolved of
liability statutorily, to the extent he
or she relies on the accounts of the
personal representative who pours-over
assets from the estate to the trust.
Va. Code Sec. 26-5.1 (Repl. vol. 1985).
5. Rule against perpetuities. The rule against per-
petuities begins to run from the time the power to
revoke the trust terminates or expires (normally,
the grantor's death), rather than from the
creation of the trust. The measuring lives need
not be in existence until the power to revoke
terminates, and the 21 year period runs from that
date. Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES Sec. 201
(4th ed. 1942). Of course, this is less a problem
in Virginia, where the "wait-and-see" approach has
been adopted.
6. Lapse. Virginia's anti-lapse statute applies to
bequests passing upon the termination of an inter
vivos trust which receives a pour-over bequest.
Va. Code Sec. 64.1-64 (Repl. vol. 1987). Like
most state anti-lapse statutes, however, it does
not apply transfers under a funded revocable
trust. Therefore, it is important to spell out in
the trust agreement what happens when a
beneficiary predeceases the grantor.
7. Trustee compensation. Virginia law provides that
the fiduciary of a trust or estate may be allowed
"reasonable compensation." Va. Code Sec. 26-30
(Repl. vol. 1985). It is useful to provide guide-
lines for the compensation of the revocable
trust's fiduciary, such as reference to a corpo-
rate fiduciary's regular fee schedules, or to
compensation based on the trustee's normal hourly
rates.
a. Pour-back problems. If the trust pours-back
to the estate, there may be a double fee.
The trustee may receive a termination fee for
ending the trust, and the executor may
receive a fee based, at least in part, on the
size of the estate, augmented by the former
trust corpus. This entire fee is deductible
for estate tax purposes as an estate adminis-
tration expense. See Estate of DeFoucancourt
v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 485 (1974).
8. Accountings. The requirement that trustees must
file annual statements of receipts and disburse-
ments within four months after the end of each
year does not apply to revocable trusts. Va. Code
Sections 26-17, 26-18 (Repl. vol. 1985). However,
the beneficiaries have a basic common law right to
an accounting from the trustee, upon filing of a
petition in court. While it is not possible to
entirely eliminate these accountings, it may be
possible to limit them. See e.g., Briggs v.
Crowley, 352 Mass. 194, 224 N.E. 2d 417 (1967).
a. While the grantor is alive, the trustee
should be required to make accountings only
to the grantor, and only upon the grantor's
request.
b. After the grantor's death, only informal
accountings should be required to be made to
any person who may be entitled to a distribu-
tion of income or corpus.
B. Executing and Funding the Revocable Trust. Generally,
there should be no serious problems in executing and
funding a revocable trust, under Virginia law.
1. Pour-overs. Under Virginia's version of the Uni-
form Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act, a will
can pour-over into a revocable if the trust is
identified in the testator's will and its terms
are set forth in a written instrument executed
(and, therefore, in existence) before the will or
concurrently with the will. Va. Code Sec. 64-
1.73(a) (1), (2) (Repl. vol. 1987).
a. "Concurrently." The meaning of concurrently
is unclear. Does the grantor have to be
ambidexterous? Probably, it means that the
execution of the two documents is done as
part of the same ceremony.
(1) On prior law requiring trust to pre-date
will, see Clark v. National Bank of
Collingwood, 38 N.J. Super. 69 (1950);
Old Colony Trust Co. v- Cleveland, 291
Mass. 380, 196 N.E. 920 (1935),
overruled Second State Street Trust Co.
v. Pinion, 170 N.E. 2d 50 (Mass. 1960).
b. Amended instruments. The Uniform Testamen-
tary Addition to Trust Act in Virginia and
most other states permits pour-overs to a
trust that is amended after execution of the
will. Va. Code Sec. 64.1-73(c) (Repl. vol.
1987).
(1) Old rule. The older rule precluded such
pour-overs. See e.g., Atwood v. Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co., 274 F. 513
(1st Cir. 1924).
(2) When planning an estate which may have
to be valid in a state which still
adopts the old rule, execute a codicil
to the will after each trust amendment.
c. Revocation. If the trust is revoked prior to
the date of death, the will pour-over lapses.
Va. Code Sec. 64.1-73(f) (Repl. vol. 1987).
It appears that if a specific bequest has
been made to a revoked trust, it passes to
the residuary beneficiary; if the residuary
bequest has been made to the revoked trust,
it passes under the law of descent and dis-
tribution. If, however, the trust is sub-
sequently amended, rather than revoked, the
will should be republished by codicil.
d. Trustees. If the trustee of a revocable
trust funded partially by pour-over and par-
tially possessing separate trust corpus does
not qualify under Virginia law, the trust
does not fail and the court can treat the
trust like a testamentary trust, and take
whatever steps are necessary to prevent
failure, such as appointing a qualified
trustee. Va. Code Sec. 64.1-73(h) (Repl.
vol. 1987).
2. Funding the Pour-Over Trust. A revocable trust
does not begin to exist until it has a corpus, so
one should normally provide some funds prior to or
contemporaneously with the execution of the will.
a. Unfunded trusts. Virginia statutory law
authorizes pour-overs to unfunded revocable
trusts. Va. Code Sec. 64.1-73 (Repl. vol.
1987). However, the trust should still be
funded because the testator may move to
another state whose law may not be so
generous.
(1) How much corpus is required? $10? $100?
$1,000?
(2) See Hageman v. Cleveland Trust, 45 Ohio
St. 2d 178, 343 N.E. 2d 121 (1976), in
which an Ohio court said that an
unfunded revocable trust had no
independent significance, but that it
could be incorporated by reference in a
will nonetheless.
(3) How should the nominal corpus be held?
Consider savings bonds.
b. Revocable life insurance trusts. The Vir-
ginia Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trust
Act validates a pour-over from a will to an
unfunded revocable life insurance trust. Va.
Code Sec. 64.1-73(b) (Repl. vol. 1987).
1. General factors. The general factors of trustee
selection, including managerial and financial
competency, solvency, e.g., apply to the selection
of the trustees of a revocable trust, particularly
the trustees to act after the incompetency or
death of the grantor.
2. Residency. If the trust is to receive a pour-over
from the will of a Virginia decedent, at least one
individual trustee must be a Virginia resident,
and all corporate fiducaries must be authorized to
do business in Virginia. Va. Code Sec. 64.1-
73(a)(3) (Repl. vol. 1987). If the trust is funded
independently and will not receive a pour-over
bequest, foreign fiduciaries would seem to be
acceptable.
3. Grantor as trustee. The grantor can be the sole
trustee, as long as there is at least one other
beneficiary, either present or future, to prevent
merger of the legal and equitable interests and
termination of the trust. The fact that the
grantor may terminate the interest of the other
beneficiaries by revoking the trust does not
eliminate their interests for purpose of the
doctrine of merger.
IV. TAX CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING A REVOCABLE TRUST.
A. Tax Considerations During the Grantor's Lifetime.
Contrary to the belief of many practitioners, revocable
trusts are fraught with income, estate, gift and
generation-skipping tax considerations. While most of
these considerations appear to be the most critical
after the grantor's death, some are of importance
during the grantor's lifetime.
1. Federal income tax considerations. There are
really no major income tax advantages or disad-
vantages in the lifetime use of a revocable trust,
though there are several areas for cautious
planning.
a. Grantor trust rules. The grantor of a
revocable trust is treated as the owner of
the trust for income tax purposes.
(1) The grantor personally takes into income
all items of ordinary income and loss,
as well as capital gain and loss.
IRC Sec. 676; and Campbell v. Comm'r,
T.C. Memo. 79,495 (1979), aff'd per
curiam without opinion (9th Cir. 1980)
(grantor taxable on income of revocable
trust although power to revoke or amend
not exercised for ten years).
(2) The trust cannot have a taxable year
distinct from that of the grantor of the
trust. Rev. Rul. 57-390, 1957-2 C.B.
326.
(3) The trust cannot have an accounting
method distinct from that of the
grantor. Rev. Rul. 57-390, 1957-2 C.B.
326.
b. Holding period. The holding period of assets
transferred to a revocable trust includes the
holding period of the assets in the hands of
the grantor.
(1) Impact of irrevocability. Once the
trust ceases to be revocable (usually on
the grantor's death), the holding period
begins anew. Rev. Rul. 73-209, 1973-1
C.B. 614.
(2) Impact of Revenue Ruling 73-209. The
fact that a new holding period begins
when the grantor dies is not normally
very significant. Under IRC Sec.
1223(11), any person who acquires
property from a decedent, including
acquisition from a trust the corpus of
which was included in the decedent's
gross estate because the trust was
revocable, takes a holding period
sufficient to produce a long-tern
capital gain. However, what of the
holding period of a donee of that
person, or another person who takes from
the initial taker in a manner otherwise
producing a carryover basis?
c. Deductibility of trust expenses. The costs
of establishing and maintaining a funded
revocable trust should be deductible as
expenses in the management and production of
income. IRC Sec. 212; Merians v- Comm'r, 60
T.C. 187 (1973); and Herbst v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo. 43,055 (1943); see also generally
Allington, "Deductibility of Estate Planning
Fees," 60 A.B.A. J. 482 (1974). This item
is, of course, subject to the new two percent
floor on miscellaneous deductions, under the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.
(1) Unfunded revocable trusts. The costs of
establishing and maintaining an
unfunded revocable trust should be
deductible only to the extent they are
attributable to tax planning. See
Merians v. Comm'r, 60 T.C. 187 (1973);
and Bagley v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 130 (1947)
(Acq. 1947-1 C.B. 1).
(2) Challenges. No deduction is allowed for
the defense of a suit challenging the
validity of a revocable trust because of
the grantor's disputed competency.
Lewis v. Comm'r, 27 T.C. 158 (1956),
aff'd 253 F. 2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958).
(3) Prepaid trustees fees. Prepaid trustees
fees cannot be currently deducted, but
must be amortized over the period to
which they relate. Rev. Rul. 58-53,
1958-1 C.B. 152.
(4) Exempt income. Fees allocable to tax-
exempt income are not deductible.
Regs. Sec. 1.212-1(e).
d. Sale of a residence. Generally, the tax
advantages on the sale of the grantor's
principal residence are retained even if the
residence is held in a revocable trust.
(1) Residence replacement rule. Recognition
of the gain on the sale of the property
used as the grantor's principal resi-
dence may still be deferred under the
residence replacement rule (IRC Sec.
1034) by purchase of a new residence for
a price exceeding the sales price of the
old residence, even if the old residence
was sold during the grantor's lifetime
by the trustee of a revocable trust
established by the grantor. Rev. Rul.
66-159, 1966-1 C.B. 152; compare Rev.
Rul. 54-583, 1954-2 C.B. 158.
(2) Over-55 rule. It appears that the over-
55 rule (IRC Sec. 121) may still be used
to eliminate up to $125,000 of taxable
gain on the sale of the principle resi-
dence of a grantor who is at least 55
years of age during the year, even if
the property is held by a revocable
trust at the time of the sale. Ltr.
Rul. 8007050 (limited to situations in
which all of the income of the trust is
taxable to the grantor whose personal
residence is sold or exchanged).
(3) Involuntary conversion. A grantor whose
real estate is involuntarily converted
(condemned or destroyed) can use IRC
Sec. 1033, to defer recognition of gain,
even if the property is held by a
revocable trust. Rev. Rul. 66-159,
1966-1 C.B. 152.
e. Installment sales. The transfer to a
revocable trust of an installment obligation
(IRC Secs. 453, 453B) is not a disposition of
that obligation, resulting in acceleration of
the deferred gain. Rev. Rul. 73-584, 1973-2
C.B. 162; Rev. Rul. 74-613, 1974-2 C.B. 153.
(1) Return of the obligation by the trust to
the grantor upon the revocation of the
trust is also not a disposition. Rev.
Rul. 76-100, 1976-1 C.B. 126.
(2) Transfer of the installment note to a
revocable trust for the benefit of joint
obligees (or the survivor) appears not
to be a dispositon of the note, as long
as the obligees are both grantors of the
trust under IRC Sec. 671. Ltr. Ruls.
8011060 and 7943063.
(3) Distribution of an installment
obligation to the beneficiaries of a
revocable trust would appear to be a
disposition, though there are no clear
precedents.
f. Savings bonds. The tranfer to a revocable
trust of series E savings bonds with untaxed
interests does not result in the acceleration
of the deferred income. Rev. Rul. 58-2,
1958-1 C.B. 236.
g. Percentage depletion. Percentage depletion
is still available for certain proven oil and
gas properties. IRC Sec. 613A. However, if
these properties are transferred after 1974,
the transferee loses the right to percentage
depletion and is limited to cost depletion.
The transfer to a revocable trust of an inte-
rest in a proven oil and gas property appears
to deprive the trust (and the grantor) of
percentage depletion. IRC Sec.
613A(c) (9) (iii), (vi); Prop. Regs. Sec.
1.613A-7(n), (o) (1977). But see Ltr. Rul.
8104202, holding that a trust of which the
tranferor is the beneficial owner is not a
transferee for purposes of IRC Sec. 613A.
h. Stock options. An employee recognizes no
gain on the receipt of an incentive stock
option or on its exercise, when the shares
are actually received. IRC Sec. 422A. These
tax advantages may be lost if the option or
stock is transferred to a revocable trust.
(1) Exercise of the option. A stock option
is qualified only if it may be exercised
solely by the employee to whom it is
granted, or the estate of the employee,
or the someone who acquires the option
by inheritance or by the reason of the
employee's death. IRC Sec. 421(c) (1).
A revocable trust which receives the
option as part of a pour-over bequest
should be able to exercise it without
depriving it of qualified status, but
not a funded revocable trust which
receives it by lifetime gift.
(2) Gift of the stock. Gain is recognized
on even the gratuitous disposition of
the stock acquired from the exercise of
an incentive stock option if the dispo-
sition is made within two years of its
receipt. IRC Sec. 422A(a) (1). While it
is not entirely clear, a gift of the
shares to a revocable trust may be a
disposition, for this purpose. See
Regs. Sec. 1.425-1(c).
i. Returns. The trustee of every trust,
including a revocable trust, must obtain a
taxpayer identification number (IRC Sec.
6078) and file an income tax return (IRC Sec.
6012). However, if the grantor or his or her
spouse is a trustee, the items of trust
income and deduction are reported directly on
the grantor's own return, and the trust uses
the grantor's social security number, rather
than obtaining a seperate taxpayer identifi-
cation number for the trust. Regs. Sec.
1.6012-3 (a) (9).
2. Gift Tax Considerations. While neither the crea-
tion of a revocable trust nor it's revocation and
return of the property to the grantor are taxable
gifts, there could arguably be a taxable gift upon
the incompetency of the grantor. On the impact of
incapacity on the includibility in the holder's
gross estate of the property subject to a power to
revoke, see Armata v. Ur}ited States, 494 F. 2d
1371 (Ct. Cl. 1974). On effect of incompetency on
includibility of the property subject to a general
power of appointment, see Rev. Rul. 75-350, 1975-2
C.B. 366; and Rev. Rul. 75-351, 1975-2 C.B. 369;
and Estate of Gilchrist v. Comm'r, 630 F. 2d 430
(5th Cir. 1980), rev'g 69 T.C. 5 (1978) (nonacq.
1978-2 C.B. 3); Estate of Alperstein v. Comm'r,
613 F. 2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'g 71 T.C. 351
(1979), cert. denied sub nom. Greenberg v. Comm'r,
446 U.S. 918 (1980); and Pennsylvania Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 597 F. 2d 382 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 980 (1979).
3. State income tax considerations. Virginia income
tax law adopts the concept of grantor trusts,
treating the grantor as the owner of a revocable
trust, and including all items of income, deduc-
tion, gain and loss directly in his or her own
income. See Va. Code Sec. 58-151.013, (Repl. vol.
1984) which initially determines an individual's
Virginia taxable income from his or her federal
adjusted gross income-
a. Double state taxation. If a revocable trust
is established with a situs in another state
which does not recognize the concept of
grantor trusts, there may be double state
income taxation.
b. State homestead property tax exemptions.
Virginia's authorized homestead property tax
exemption for the property "owned and used"
by a person 65 years of age or disabled may
be inapplicable if the residence is placed in
a revocable trust. Va. Code Sec. 58-760.1
(Repl. vol 1984)
c. Real property transfer taxes. In some
localities (Montgomery County, Maryland and
the District of Columbia, for example),
though not Virginia, there may be transfer
taxes imposed on the transfer of real
property to a revocable trust. Va. Code Sec.
58-61 (Repl. vol. 1984) (recordation tax
inapplicable to deeds of gift).
4. Generation-skipping transfer tax considerations.
a. Transition rule problems. No tax is imposed
under IRC chapter 13, on a generation-
skipping transfer from an irrevocable trust
which was in existence on September 25, 1985,
if the trust was not amended.
(1) The regulations on the old generation-
skipping tax effective dates stated that
a trust is "revocable" if its corpus
would be included in the grantor's gross
estate under IRC Sec. 2038. Regs. Sec.
26.2601-1(c) (1).
(2) IRC Sec. 2038 covers not only revocable
trusts, but trusts subject to a power to
alter, amend, or terminate. The old
regs make it clear, however, that this
rule does not apply if the power or
interest is one which will cause such
taxation only upon an event not within
the grantor's control, (as with a
grantor retained income trust). Regs.
Sec. 26.2601-1(c) (1).
(3) A trust should not be revocable for this
purpose, if the exercise of the power to
revoke is subject to a condition prece-
dent which had not occurred on September
25, 1985, even if it occurs before 1982.
Regs. Sec. 26.2601-1(c) (1).
(4) Any additions or amendments made after
September 25, 1985, to an irrevocable
trust, which increase the generation-
skipping transfer or the number of
skipped generations, will destroy the
protection of the entire trust. Regs.
Sec. 26.2601-1(e)(2). The protection of
the entire trust is lost if the trust is
amended or an addition is made after
September 25, 1985. The protection is
not lost ratably, as is the case with
irrevocable trusts. Regs Sec. 26.2601-
1(e) (2).
(5) Amendments which do not destroy the
protected status of a revocable trust
include:
(a) Amendments which are basically
administrative or clarifying in
nature and only incidentally
increase the amount of generation-
skipping transfers, such as a
change in the number or indentity
of trustees. Regs. 26.2601-
1(d)(1)(i) and 26.2601-
1(d) (3) (Examples 1 and 2).
(b) Amendments which are made to assure
an existing marital, charitable, or
orphan's deduction for estate, gift
or generation-skipping transfer tax
purposes. Regs. Sec. 26.2601-
1(d) (1) (ii) and 26.2601-
1(d) (3) (Examples 5).
(c) Amendments which only change the
identity or share of existing bene-
ficiaries, without adding younger
generation beneficiaries, such as
addition of an additional nephew to
a class of nephews who are benefi-
ciaries. Regs. Sec. 26.2601-
1(d) (3) (Examples 10, 11, and 12).
b. The transition rules also make the new
Chapter 13 generation-skipping transfer tax
inapplicable to transfers under a will in
existence on October 22, 1986, if the
testator dies before January 1, 1987. The
Technical Corrections Act of 1987, H.R. 2636
and S. 1350, Sec. 114(g) (2), 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1987), would extend this treatment to
revocable trusts, and to wills and revocable
trust whose creators died after January 1,
1987, if the creator was incompetent to
change the instruments on September 25, 1985
and at all times thereafter until his or her
death.
B. Post Mortem Tax Considerations. The death of the
grantor of a revocable trust completely changes the
character of the trust. It ceases to be revocable and
becomes a permanent trust, creating serious potential
income and estate tax problems and planning
opportunities.
1. Duration of the revocable trust. Upon the
grantor's death, a revocable trust becomes a
permanent, irrevocable trust, terminating only
according to its own terms. Since the avail-
ability of various income tax planning techniques
ends with the termination of the trust, careful
attention should be paid to when the trust
terminates.
a. Termination. A revocable trust normally
terminates only after distribution of its
assets and termination of all of its func-
tions. Regs. Sec. 1.641(b)-3(b); Rev. Rul.
73-97, 1973-1 C.B. 404, distinguishing Rev.
Rul. 57-495, 1957-2 C.B. 616.
b. Pour-overs. When the estate pours assets
over into a revocable trust, which then
divides the assets into marital and non-
marital shares and terminates, the wording of
the trust agreement often requires termina-
tion "upon the grantor's death" or requiring
distributions "immediatley upon receipt of
the assets from the estate." None of these
terms accelerate trust termination for estate
tax purposes. Rather, they present a point
of reference for ascertaining the distribu-
tive shares.
2. Trusts vs. estates--a comparison. Many practi-
tioners incorrectly assume that a post mortem
revocable trust is taxed like the grantor's
estate. There are a number of similarities in tax
treatment, but also numerous distinctions in the
tax treatment of these two entities.
a. Basis. Property received from the decedent
by distribution from a revocable trust
receives the same date of death (or alternate
valuation date) value basis as property
received directly from the estate. IRC Sec.
1014(b) (1), (b) (2).
b. Holding period. The holding period of
property received from the decedent by
distribution from a revocable trust is
sufficient to produce a long-term capital
gain upon sale or exchange, like the holding
period of property received directly from the
decedent. IRC Sec. 1221(11).
c. Taxable year. An estate may use a fiscal
year, but a revocable trust (even one funded
by pour-over), must adopt a calendar year.
IRC Sec. 645.
d. Accumulation distributions. Estates are not
subject to the throwback rule on accumulation
distributions, so income taxed to an estate
will not thereafter be taxed to the bene-
ficiaries. IRC Sec. 643(a) (3); Regs. Sec.
1.643(a)-3(a). The post mortem revocable
trust is fully subject to the throwback rule.
e. Trapping distributions. When an estate which
has income distributes corpus to a simple
trust, distributable net income (DNI) may be
carried out. The simple trust (such as a
marital deduction power of appointment trust)
has income which it may not distribute, and
this income is exempt from the throwback
computation in connection with future distri-
butions, unless it consists of "outside
income," such as income in respect of a dece-
dent (IRD). Regs. Sec. 1.665(e)-1A(b).
Trapping distributions from a revocable trust
to a simple subsidiary trust, however, are
subject to the throwback rule when later
distributed by the simple trust.
f. Personal exemptions. An estate receives a
personal exemption of $600, while the exemp-
tion for a post mortem revocable trust is
$100 (for complex trusts) or $300 (for simple
trusts). IRC Sec. 642(b), (c).
g. Estimated taxes. Estates are exempt from the
requirement of quarterly estimated income
taxes for the first two years. IRC Sec. 6652.
h. Depreciated property and pecuniary bequests.
If an estate or trust distributes depreciated
property in satisfaction of a pecuniary
bequest, a loss is realized. Under IRC Sec.
267(a) (1), however, an estate can deduct the
loss but a trust cannot deduct the loss. The
lost deduction can be saved by having the
trustee sell the property to a third-person
and distribute the cash proceeds.
i. Charitable "set-asides." An estate receives
an income tax deduction for amounts paid or
set aside for charities. A revocable trust
receives no deduction for amounts set aside
for charitable purposes. IRC Sec. 642(c).
Therefore, when a charity is the residuary
beneficiary of an estate, capital gains
realized during the administration period can
be deducted when set aside, but a trust
recognizing such gains cannot deduct them
unless they are actually paid out.
j. Stock options. An estate may exercise an
incentive stock option without recognizing a
gain, but a revocable trust which received
the option by lifetime transfer cannot
exercise it tax-free. However, a provision
may be inserted in the stock option plan or
in the option itself permitting the employee
to designate an agent, such as the trustee of
the revocable trust, to exercise the option
after his or her death. Regs. Sec.
1.421-7 (b) (2).
3. Planning trust income distributions. It is advan-
tageous to permit the trustee to make discre-
tionary distributions, rather than making it a
simple trust (which must distribute all of its
income annually).
a. Income splitting. The trust can accumulate
some income and distribute some income,
multiplying the taxpayers and the use of
lower tax brackets and personal exemptions.
Obviously, after the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
the trust's compressed rate brackets and the
"kiddie tax" rules applicable to bene-
ficiaries under age 14 reduce these
advantages, but they are not eliminated.
b. Throwback problems. While estate distribu-
tions of undistributed net income (UNI) are
not subject to the throwback rule, trust
distributions are taxed to the beneficiaries
under the throwback rule.
(1) Distributions of UNI by a revocable
trust to a subsidiary trust in the first
year of the latter's existence should
not subject to throwback because there
are no "preceding taxable years." Regs.
Sec. 1.665(e)-1(A)(1) (i).
(2) Ordinarily, a simple trust (such as a
marital deduction power of appointment
trust) cannot make an accumulation
distribution because its UNI is never
attributable to a "preceding taxable
year." However, simple subsidiary trust
UNI attributable to "outside income,"
including distributions carrying out DNI
from another trust (the revocable
trust), is treated as attributable to a
preceding taxable year. Therefore, when
the simple subsidiary trust terminates,
its beneficiaries may be taxed under the
throwback rule. See also Charles W.
Ufford, Jr., "Income Taxation of the
Funded Revocable Trust After the Death
of the Grantor," 30 TAX LAWYER 37 (1976).
c. Delayed distributions. If the trust instru-
ment does not authorize the trustee to with-
hold income, the trustee may still be able to
do so if there is some uncertainty as to the
precise distributive shares, as when estate
taxes and expenses must be computed to deter-
mine the amount passing under a pecuniary
formula marital deduction clause. IRC Secs.
651, 662; see also First Trust and Deposit
Co. v. Comm'r, 41 B.T.A. 107 (1940), (nonacq.
1944 C.B. 38), aff'd 118 F. 2d 449 (2d Cir.
1941); Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company
(Work Estate) v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 741
(1936); but see also Estate of Bryant v.
Comm'r, 14 T.C. 127 (1949), aff'd 185 F. 2d
517 (4th Cir. 1950); see also discussion in
Richard B. Covey, "The Advantages and
Disadvantages of the Revocable Trust in
Estate Planning," 26th N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1379, 1395-96 (1968); and Howard M.
Zaritsky, "Special Trusts and Unique
Problems: Grantor Trusts after the Grantor's
Death, Alimony Trusts, and Foreign Trusts
versus Domestic Trusts," 37th N.Y.U. INST. ON
FED. TAX 42-1, 42-5 (1979).
d. Timing capital gains distributions. Capital
gains recognized by a post mortem revocable
trust do not increase DNI unless they are
allocated to income under, the trust agree-
ment or local law, or they are actually paid
to the beneficiaries. IRC Sec. 643(a)(3);
Regs. Sec. 1.643(a)-3(a).
(1) Problems of post-death appreciation.
Unless the gains are allocated to DNI,
the trust, and not the beneficiaries, is
taxed on the gain, since there is no
throwback with respect to capital gains.
A pecuniary formula marital trust's
share of the revocable trust corpus does
not include appreciation accruing after
the testator's death, and such apprecia-
tion passes to the non-marital share
trust. Therefore, if corpus is distri-
buted to the marital trust in the same
year that capital gains are distributed
to the non-marital trust, an inequity
results because both trusts are taxed on
a share of the capital gain in propor-
tion to their shares of the revocable
trust's DNI, though the capital gains
really go only to the non-marital share
trust. Regs. Sec. 1.662(a)-3(c).
(2) Planning solution. The trustee of the
revocable trust should withhold capital
gains distributions and let the trust be
taxed on the gain; then distribute the
gain in a year in which no corpus dis-
tributions are made to the marital
trust.
4. Estate inclusion. Obviously, the initial estate
tax consideration is that the value of the corpus
of a revocable trust is includible in the estate
of the deceased grantor. IRC Sec. 2038.
a. Joint powers. The corpus is included in the
grantor's gross estate even though the power
to revoke is exercisable only in conjunction
with another person, since IRC Sec.
2038(a) (1) refers to a power held by the
deceased "alone or by the decedent in con-
junction with any other person."
b. When exercisable. There is no estate inclu-
sion unless the power to revoke was
exercisable on the date of death. When a
power could not be exercised without the
consent of both of the grantor's children,
who were also trust beneficiaries, and one of
the children had predeceased, rendering revo-
cation impossible, there was no estate inclu-
sion in Estate of Webster v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.
968 (1977) (Acq. 1977-2 C.B. 2).
6. Trustee as executor. When a revocable trust has
been used as a will substitute and it is funded
with most of the grantor's property, there may be
little or no probate estate and no executor
appointed under local law.
a. Who is the executor. For estate tax purposes
generally, the "executor" is either the
person so appointed by the will or local law
(or appointed administrator), or if no such
person has been appointed, "any person in
actual or constructive possession of any
property of the decedent." IRC Sec. 2203.
This should include the trustee of a
revocable trust that holds most of the dece-
dent's assets.
b. Joint returns. The executor may elect to
file a joint income tax return with the sur-
viving spouse. IRC Sec. 6013(a)(3). The
executor, for this purpose, includes only an
individual who is appointed to such an office
and not merely one holding the decedent's
property. Treas. Regs. Sec. 1.6013-4.
(1) No executor. If no executor is
appointed, the surviving spouse can file
a joint return and, unless an appointed
executor disavows the filing within one
year of the filing date, the return
stands as filed. Regs. Sec.
1. 6013-1 (d) (3).
(2) Surviving spouse dies too. If the sur-
viving spouse dies before the filing
date for the income tax return and all
of the surviving spouse's property was
in a revocable trust as well, it is
possible that no one can file a joint
return.
(3) There is no legitimate reason why a
personal representative cannot be
appointed by a probate court absent a
probate estate. Where the deceased
lived and died out-of-state and left no
Virginia estate, an administration that
is granted is voidable, but not void.
Andrews v. Avary, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.)
229 (1858); and Fisher v. Bassett, 36
Va. (9 Leigh) 119 (1837). Also, in Com-
monwealth v. Hudgin, 29 Va. (2 Leigh)
248 (1830), the Circuit Court for
Henrico County held that it had juris-
diction to grant administration to a
nonresident who had no estate in
Virginia but who had a claim against the
Commonwealth.
c. QTIP Elections. The decedent's executor is
supposed to make the QTIP election. In Ltr.
Rul. 8335033 held that the trustee of a
funded revocable trust could make this elec-
tion when there was no personal representa-
tive appointed, citing IRC Sec. 2203.
d. Series E bonds. The IRS ruled that the
executor of the estate of a decedent who had
transferred series E savings bonds to a
revocable trust could elect (IRC Sec. 454(a))
to report the unreported interest on the
decedent's final income tax return. The
executor, rather than the trustee, was held
to have the authority to make the election
because the executor was the one obligated to
file the final income tax return, on which
the interest would be reported. Rev. Rul.
79-409, 1979-2 C.B. 208.
6. Alternate valuation date. The estate tax value of
a decedent's assets will be their fair market
value on the date of death or, if elected, the
alternate valuation date. The alternate valuation
date is the date six months following the date of
death or, if earlier, the date of the distribution
of an estate asset. IRC Sec. 2032. Revocable
trust distributions within the first six months
following the date of death may establish the
alternate valuation date for distributed assets.
a. "Distribution." The date of distribution of
estate assets within the first six months
after the date of death is the alternate
valuation date.
(1) The concept of a distribution, for this
purpose, comprehends "all possible ways
by which property ceases to form a part
of the gross estate." Regs. Sec.
20.2032-1(c) (1).
(2) Mere bookkeeping divisions of a
revocable trust into subsidiary trusts
does not establish the alternate valua-
tion date without an actual distribution
to the trusts. Rev. Rul. 71-396, 1971-2
C.B. 328.
(3) A trustee's ability to compel distribu-
tions within six months after the dece-
dent's death does not alone establish
the alternate valuation date. Rev. Rul.
78-431, 1978-2 C.B. 230 (community
property was held in a revocable trust
and, upon the death of one spouse,
divided into two shares: a decedent's
share (retained in trust) and a survi-
ving spouse's share which was dis-
tributed. Neither the distribution of
the surviving spouse's share nor the
trustee's ability to compel distribution
constituted a distribution for alternate
valuation purposes).
b. Estate distributions. The distribution of
estate assets to a revocable trust the corpus
of which was includible in the decedent's
gross estate should not establish the alter-
nate valuation date, since the assets remain
part of the gross estate.
c. Trust divisions and distributions. Revocable
trusts commonly divide their assets
(including those received as a pour-over from
the estate) into subsidiary marital and non-
marital deduction trusts. The I.R.S. has
ruled that a division of the corpus of a
revocable trust into two separate shares
without termination of the revocable trust
does not constitute a distribution
establishing the alternate valuation date.
Rev. Rul. 57-495, 1957-2 C.B. 616. However,
a division of the trust corpus of a revocable
trust into separate shares did establish the
alternate valuation date when the trust then
dropped the assets into subsidiary trusts and
terminated. Rev. Rul. 73-97, 1973-1 C.B.
404. The IRS distinguished the two rulings
by the fact that the revocable trust had not
terminated in the 1957 ruling, but this dis-
tinction appears artificial and ill-con-
sidered. See discussion in Julian S. Bush,
"The Closely Held Business in the Revocable
Trust: Advantages and Post-Death Problems,"
34th N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 1621, 1647-
1649 (1976): Stanton D. Rosenbaum, "Unique
Applications and Pitfalls of Revocable
Trusts," 29th U. SO. CAL. TAX INST. 503, 518
(1977): and Howard M. Zaritsky, "Special
Trusts and Unique Problems: Grantor Trusts
After the Grantor's Death, Alimony Trusts,
and Foreign Trusts versus Domestic Trusts,"
37th N.Y.U. INST_ ON FED. TAX. ch. 42, at 42-
12 to 42-13 (1979).
7. Deduction of administration expenses. An income
tax deduction or an estate tax deduction, but not
both, is allowed for their reasonable expenses of
estate administration. IRC Secs. 642(g) and 2053.
a. General rule. The administration expenses of
a revocable trust, whether funded or
unfunded, are deductible against the gross
estate to the extent they are subject to the
debts and claims of the estate. Regs. Sec.
20.2053-1(a) (1); and Estate of DeFoucancourt
v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 485 (1974).
b. Exceptions:
(1) Trust assets not subject to estate
claims. If the assets of the revocable
trust are not available to satisfy
estate claims and expenses, the only
deductible trust administration expenses
are those engenered by the decedent's
death, incurred in vesting good title in
the beneficiaries, and paid within three
years from the filing of the estate tax
return. Regs. Sec. 20.2053-8.
(2) Excess deductible estate expenses. If
the total of the deductible estate
administration expenses exceeds the
estate subject to claims, other expenses
incurred by the trust may be deducted,
if paid before the return is filed.
Regs. Sec. 20.2053-1(c).
c. Planning. Normally, executors consider only
the relative income and estate tax brackets
of the estate in determining whether to
deduct these costs as income or estate tax
expenses. When a revocable trust has been
used, however, income-splitting will commonly
occur and the estate tax brackets should be
compared with the income tax brackets of both
the estate and the trust.
8. Special use valuation. Real property used in a
farm or other closely-held business may be valued
at its present use, rather than at its highest and
best use, if certain requirements are met. IRC
Sec. 2032A. The election to specially valued real
estate may be imperiled if the property is held in
a revocable trust.
a. "Acquired from the decedent." The specially
valued real property must be acquired from
the decedent, as defined for basis purposes.
Consequently, acquisition through a revocable
trust will not jeopardize the special use
valuation, even if the property is distri-
buted in satisfaction of a pecuniary bequest.
IRC Sec. 2032A(e) (9).
b. Ownership through a trust. The specially
valued real property must have been owned by
the decedent and must pass to qualified
heirs. The legislative history of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 required the Treasury
Department to issue regulations explaining
how the property is to be treated when it is
owned in trust, and these regulations were
issued in July, 1980. See Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1976 at 539 (1976) (Committee Print); and
Regs. Sec. 20.2032A-3(b) (1).
(1) The regulations require that a qualified
heir receiving an indirect interest in
real property, because the property is
owned by a trust, must receive or
acquire "a present interest in the
property (determined under section 2503)
from the decedent." Regs. Sec.
20.2032A-3(b) (1).
(2) Material participation. The regulations
allow material participation of the
decedent and the heirs though the
property is owned by a trust. However,
such participation must be pursuant to
an arrangement calling for material
participation by the decedent or a
family member, in one of four
situations:
(a) The arrangement may result from
appointment of the decedent or
family member as trustee;
(b) The arrangement may result from an
employer-employee relationship in
which the participant is employed
by a qualified closely-held
business owned by the trust in a
position requiring material
participation in its activities;
(c) The participants may enter into a
contract with the trustee to
manage, or take part in managing,
the real property for the trust; or
(d) The trust agreement may expressly
grant the managerial rights to the
beneficial owner.
9. Extended estate tax payments. Estate taxes are
normally due when the return is required to be
filed, nine months after the date of death. IRC
Secs. 6075(a), 6151. However, IRC Sec. 6166
allows the payment of the estate taxes
attributable to an interest in a closely-held
business in up to ten equal annual installments,
with a five year moratorium on payments. The
benefits of IRC Sec. 6166 are available to
business interests held in revocable trusts, as
well as those passing to the personal
representative's control.
10. S corporation stock. The shareholders of a small
business corporation may elect to have the income
of the corporation taxed directly to them,
avoiding tax at the corporate level. Special post
mortem planning problems arise when subchapter S
stock is held by a revocable trust. See Burton W.
Kantor, "Use of a Grantor Trust as a Subchapter S
Shareholder Made Easier by 1978 Revenue Act," 50
J. TAX'N 194 (April 1979); and Burton W. Kantor,
"Planning and Pitfalls on the Disposition of Sub-
chapter S Stock Held by a Grantor Trust," 50 J.
TAX'N 284 (May 1979).
a. A revocable trust as a shareholder. Prior to
the 1976 Tax Reform Act, revocable trusts
could not be subchapter S shareholders. See
e.g., American Nurseryman Publishing Co. v.
Comm'r, 75 T.C. No. 19 (1980) (decided under
pre-1976 Act rules, in which the transfer of
the stock to the trust was made uninten-
tionally and a state court voided it ab
initio, but the corporate election was-still
involuntarily terminated). The 1976 Act said
that a revocable trust (or any other trust
"treated as owned by the grantor under sub-
part E of part I of subchapter J") may be a
subchapter S shareholder. IRC. Sec.
1371(f)(1).
b. Post mortem problems. After the grantor
dies, however, a revocable trust ceases to be
described in subpart E of part I of subchap-
ter J, so the 1978 Revenue Act amended the
statutory rules to provide that if the entire
corpus of the trust was includible in the
grantor's gross estate, as with a revocable
trust, the subchapter S election is not ter-
minated when the grantor dies. Rather, the
trustee may distribute the stock to another
eligible shareholder within two years
following the date of death. IRC Sec.
1371(e) (1) (B).
c. Planning problems.
(1) Perhaps the greatest problem is that the
revocable trust is not permanently a
subchapter S shareholder and corrective
action must be taken within only two
years. The trust must dispose of the
stock and, if the trust agreement con-
tains no express provision for distribu-
tion of the stock, the trustee is placed
in the rather precarious position of
weighing violation of the trust agree-
ment against possibly adverse income tax
consequences.
(2) Even if the trustee can distribute the
stock to the trust beneficiaries, the
election will be terminated if the bene-
ficiaries are not themselves qualifying
shareholders. For example, if the bene-
ficiaries are nonresident aliens, corpo-
rations, or other trusts, the corporate
election will terminate. Additionally,
if the remainder of the trust is to be
distributed to more than one bene-
ficiary, the division of the stock may
increase the number of shareholders
above the permissible 35.
11. Buy-sell agreements with revocable trusts. If
closely-held stock is held in a revocable trust,
caution should be exercised in the entering into
of buy-sell agreements. If the trust is subse-
quently revoked, the agreement may be voided and
the valuation established in the agreement will
cease to be binding for estate tax purposes. See
Anderson v. Comm'r, 619 F. 2d 587 (6th Cir. 1980),
aff'g, T.C. Memo para. 77,237 (1977).
12. Discharge of the executor's liability. Both the
executor of the estate and the trustee of the
revocable trust are liable for the estate taxes
attaching to the property under their control, to
the extent it was includible in the grantor's
gross estate. IRC Sec. 6324(a) (2).
a. Request for discharge. The executor can file
a request for discharge of personal liability
for any deficiency. IRC Sec. 2204. The
trustee of a revocable trust cannot take
advantage of this discharge request. Rev.
Rul. 57-424, 1957-2 C.B. 523 (in which there
were both an executor and a trustee). If the
same person is both trustee and executor, it
is not clear whether any discharge can be
effectuated.
b. Transferee liability. Transferee liability
applies only to the liability relating to
assets of the grantor's estate under IRC
Secs. 2034 through 2042, and not to those
included under IRC Sec. 2033. Therefore, if
a funded revocable trust pours-back to the
estate upon the decedent's death, the trustee
is not subject to transferee liability with
regard to these properties. Rev. Rul. 75-
553, 1975-2 C.B. 477.
13. Disclaimers. An individual may, without estate or
gift tax consequences, disclaim an interest
passing to the individual by gift or bequest. The
disclaimer must be unequivocal, valid, and must be
made within nine months after the transfer of the
property to the disclaimant. IRC Sec. 2518. The
IRS has ruled privately that a disclaimer of an
interest in a revocable trust funded by a pour-
over from the grantor's will must be made within
nine months from the date of death, when the trust
is funded, since before that time the disclaimant
has no disclaimable interest. Ltr. Rul. 8003020.
14. Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Problems. The $1
million exemption for generation-skipping trans-
fers may be allocated by "the transfer (or his
executor)." IRC Sec. 2631(a) (1). Furthermore,
where a marital deduction is allowed for qualify-
ing terminable interest property in trust, "the
estate of the decedent or the donor spouse" may
elect to treat the property as if no such election
had been made. IRC Sec. 2652(a)(3). In both
cases, what if there is no personal representative
because the entire estate is contained in a funded
revocable trust?
a. IRC Sec. 2203, which says that when there is
no personal representative appointed under
state law, the person in custody of property
is the "executor" for purpose of estate tax
elections and filing the estate tax return.
There is no comparable provision in Chapter
13.
b. Is a pour-back of the trust funds to the
estate required to permit this election?
